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Popson: In re Grand Jury Proceedings

In re Grand Jury Proceedings1 : The Semantics of “Presumption” and “Need.”
I. INTRODUCTION
Less than one month following the Supreme Court decision in United States v.
Nixon2 and ten days after Richard Nixon’s resignation,3 scholar Alan Westin boldly
predicted the obvious: “[the Court’s] definition of executive privilege promises to be a
source of fertile legal and political disputes in the future.”4 Five presidents and twentyfour years later, the doctrine of executive privilege remains volatile and controversial. 5
In the midst of the high stakes battle over information between the Clinton
administration and the Office of the Independent Counsel, 6 the judiciary was again
drawn into the fray in In re Grand Jury Proceedings. 7
The issue of secrecy8 in a president’s execution of Article II duties 9 dates to the
1

5 F. Supp. 2d. 21 (D.D.C. May 27, 1998) (Nos. 98-095(NHJ), 98-096(NHJ), 98-097(NHJ)),
rev'd on other grounds, In re Lindsey, 1998 WL 719542 (D.C.Cir. Jul 27, 1998) (No. 98-3060, 983062, 98-3072), cert. denied by, Office of the President v. Office of Independent Counsel, 1998
WL 541012 (1998) (No. 98-316).
2
418 U.S. 683 (1974). The Supreme Court ordered President Nixon to produce the
infamous White House tape-recordings for in camera inspection by the Federal District Court
for the District of Columbia, setting the first and only high court precedent relative to
executive privilege.
3
President Richard M. Nixon announced his resignation on August 8, 1974, in the midst
of the Watergate scandal. The Supreme Court decision in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683 (1974) played a significant role in Nixon’s resignation. Alan Westin, The Case for
America, in UNITED STATES V. NIXON: THE PRESIDENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT at xi (Leon
Friedman ed., 1974).
4
Id. at xi-xii.
5
For a comprehensive bibliography of scholarly literature on the topic of executive
privilege which was published in the aftermath of the Iran-Contra controversy, see Mark J.
Rozell, Executive Privilege: A Bibliographic Essay, 4 J.L. & POL. 639 (1988).
6
See infra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
7
5 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 1998).
8
For discussions on secrecy in government, see A CULTURE OF SECRECY, THE
GOVERNMENT VERSUS THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO KNOW (Athan G. Theoharis ed., University
Press of Kansas 1998) (discussing initiatives to ensure that bureaucratic interests in secrecy
do not impair historical research endeavors); M ORTON H. HALPERIN & DANIEL N. HOFFMAN,
TOP SECRET : NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW (1977) (arguing that governmental
secrecy demands regulation outside the executive branch); JOHN M . ORMAN, PRESIDENTIAL
SECRECY AND DECEPTION, BEYOND THE POWER TO PERSUADE (1980) (evaluating presidential
uses of secrecy from the Kennedy through the Ford administrations and offering guidelines
for democratic accountability through legislation).
9
The President’s powers and duties are enumerated in Article II, Sections 2 and 3 of the
Constitution:
SECTION 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
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infancy of the federal government under the Constitution.10 Throughout history,
presidents periodically have refused to disclose information requested by the Congress
and the courts.11 The issue of secrecy in the executive branch came to a head during
the Watergate scandal of the Nixon administration.12 In the immediate aftermath of
Watergate, the competing interests of democratic accountability and federal separation
of powers provided the framework for arguments over the existence of executive
privilege. 13 Today, those competing interests shape the arguments over the boundaries

of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the
actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the
principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to
the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves
and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of
Impeachment.
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate,
and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law
vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during
the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of
their next Session.
SECTION 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the
State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he
shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene
both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with
Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall
think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of
the United States.
U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, §3.
10

M ARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: THE DILEMMA OF SECRECY AND DEMOCRATIC
A CCOUNTABILITY 32-36 (1994). In 1796, George Washington refused to comply with a
congressional request for information regarding secret executive communications made in
contemplation of the Jay Treaty. Id. at 35. Washington discussed withholding information
from Congress as early as 1792 in response to a congressional inquiry into the military
expeditions of General Arthur St. Clair. Id. at 32-34.
11
For a concise history of presidential assertions of executive privilege, see id. at 32-48.
12
For a concise history of the Watergate scandals, see Frank Tuerkheimer, Watergate as
History, 1990 W IS . L. REV. 1323, 1324-27 (reviewing STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE W ARS OF
W ATERGATE: THE LAST CRISIS OF RICHARD NIXON (1990)).
13
See RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL M YTH Pg. #1 (1974).
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In re Grand Jury Proceedings15 provides a glimpse into the doctrine of executive
privilege and demonstrates that the doctrine does not exist in a vacuum.16 Each
Berger argues that the power of the executive branch to withhold information from the
coordinate branches of government does not exist by express provision in the Constitution,
nor may be it implied from the enumerated powers of Article II. Id.; see also Raoul Berger,
Executive Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry, 12 UCLA L. REV. 1043 (1965); Raoul Berger,
The Incarnation of Executive Privilege, 22 UCLA L. REV. 4, 29 (1974); DAVID W ISE, THE
POLITICS OF LYING: GOVERNMENT DECEPTION, SECRECY, AND POWER 64 (1973). For preWatergate discussions of executive privilege, see Joseph W. Bishop Jr., The Executive’s
Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Constitutional Question, 66 YALE L.J. 477 (1957); Paul
Hardin, III, Executive Privilege in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 879 (1962); Robert Kramer
& Herman Marcuse, Executive Privilege - A Study of the Period 1953-1960, 29 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 623 (1961).
14
See generally ROZELL supra note 10. Some scholars have argued in favor of legislation
fixing the boundaries of executive privilege. See e.g. James Hamilton and John C. Grabow, A
Legislative Proposal for Resolving Executive Privilege Disputes Precipitated by
Congressional Subpoenas, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 145 (1984). Conversely, Rozell argues that
legislative action “is bound to fail given the impossibility of determining all of the
circumstances under which executive privilege may be exercised in the future.” ROZELL, supra
note 10, at 147. Moreover, “Congress already has the institutional capability to challenge
claims of executive privilege by means other than eliminating the right to withhold information
or attaching statutory restrictions on the exercise of that right.” Id. at 148. Given the Supreme
Court’s recognition of a qualified executive power to withhold information, any limitation on
that power may be unenforceable as a violation of separation of powers. Id.; cf. GERALD
GUNTHER & KATHLEEN SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 366 (13th ed. 1997) (questioning
whether Congress would have authority under the necessary and proper clause to enact
guidelines for the negotiation of executive agreements with foreign nations). For example, if a
President exercises his power to withhold certain information in a manner permissible under
United States v. Nixon but impermissible under a statutory restriction, the President could
argue that the statute is unconstitutional “as applied.” Id. Since the Court held that the
Executive’s power to withhold certain information is rooted in the President’s Article II
powers, it is conceivable that Congress lacks the authority to restrict that power. Id.
15
5 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 1998).
16
ROZELL, supra note 10, at 154. “Two executive privilege claims that, on the surface,
appear equally valid may be treated very differently from one another given different
circumstances.” Id.; see also, Westin, supra note 3, at xii-xiv.
When the political situation is too dangerous for the Supreme Court (e.g., if a ruling
against the President is likely to be disobeyed by him or to produce serious reprisals
against the Court’s powers or prestige), the Court should find a way to duck the
issue or deflect it, leaving its immediate resolution to the larger political process.
But if the political situation is favorable (that is, if a ruling against the President will
enjoy broad public and Congressional support and virtually compel presidential
compliance), then the Court is free (if the case warrants it) to do the two things most
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presidential assertion of executive privilege involves unique political circumstances,17 as
well as a specific procedural posture which have profound effects on the balancing of
interests in each case. 18 The media and partisan politicians have greeted modern
presidential assertions of executive privilege with self-serving comparisons to
Watergate, 19 causing more than one president to temper or even disguise the privilege in
an effort to avoid negative political ramifications.20
This note analyzes the District Court of the District of Columbia’s application of the
doctrine of executive privilege in In re Grand Jury Proceedings. 21 Part II provides a
beloved by judges - uphold the ‘rule of law’ against claims of prerogative or
privilege by the executive, and expand still further the discretionary power of the
judiciary in the American constitutional system.
Id. at xii-xiii.
In other words, the Supreme Court generally tends to be a prudent body; it has had
to be for the unique power of judicial review to have survived so long in a majorityrule republic. But when one of the fundamental tenets of the American
constitutional system is widely regarded by the public as under assault by one of
the elected branches of national government, the Justices can and do unite in
defense of such basic values.
Id. at xiv.
17
R.H. Clark, Executive Privilege: A Review of Berger, 8 A KRON L. REV. 324, 327 (1975).
Executive privilege claims arise in two distinct circumstances: first, when the executive
refuses to disclose information to the legislative branch; and second, when the executive
refuses to disclose information to the judicial branch. Id. This note deals exclusively with the
latter situation.
18
Westin, supra note 3, at xiv.
19
ROZELL, supra note 10, at 62-63. Ironically, the doctrine of Executive Privilege
entrenched itself during the 1950’s in part as a response to “McCarthyist” congressional
investigations. Clark, supra note 17, at 325. President Eisenhower used the public’s distrust
of congressional investigations to justify numerous assertions of executive privilege. Id.
20
See generally Randall K. Miller, Congressional Inquests: Suffocating the
Constitutional Prerogative of Executive Privilege, 81 M INN. L. REV. 631 (1997) (arguing that
congressional abuse of investigatory power has weakened the President’s constitutional
power to withhold information); see also ROZELL, supra note 10, at 140-141.
21
5 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 1998). A second issue in In re Grand Jury Proceedings was
the applicability of government attorney-client privilege and the “work product doctrine.” at
Id. at 30. The district court held that the government attorney-client privilege is a qualified
privilege, and found that the Office of the Independent Counsel demonstrated a sufficient
showing of need to overcome the privilege. Id. at 39. Accordingly, the court compelled the
grand jury testimony of White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey. Id. at 39. The White House
has appealed the district court’s decision exclusively challenging the attorney-client privilege
and work product rulings. Peter Baker and Ruth Marcus, Appeals Court Hears Privilege
Case, WASH. POST, June 30, 1998, at A5. On June 4, 1998, the Supreme Court declined a
request by the Office of the Independent Counsel for a direct appeal to the high Court, stating
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brief history of executive privilege and discusses precedents that impacted the court’s
decision.22 Part III indicates the procedural posture of the case and sets forth the
substantive facts.23 Part IV discusses the court’s analysis of the executive privilege
issue in light of recent District of Columbia Circuit Court decisions.24 Part V concludes
that In re Grand Jury Proceedings bolstered the notion of a presumption in favor of the
privilege, while observing that the sufficiency of the evidence presented to overcome
the privilege must be evaluated in retrospect.25
II. BACKGROUND
Executive privilege is fundamentally a product of the doctrine of separation of
powers.26 The issue arises when the executive branch refuses to disclose information
to a coordinate branch of government.27 While executive privilege issues most
commonly develop as conflicts between Congress and the executive branch, 28 the
judicial branch remains the ultimate arbiter in the context of constitutional inter-branch
disputes.29
The judicial branch did not encounter a formal assertion of executive privilege until

“[i]t is assumed that the Court of Appeals will proceed expeditiously to decide this case.”
United States v. Clinton, 118 S.Ct. 2079, 2080 (1998) . The D.C. Circuit heard arguments on
June 29, 1998. Peter Baker and Ruth Marcus, Appeals Court Hears Privilege Case, W ASH.
POST, June 30, 1998, at A5. In a later opinion, the D.C. Circuit qualified the district court ruling
on attorney-client privilege. See In re Lindsey, 1998 WL 719542 (D.C.Cir. Jul 27, 1998) (No. 983060, 98-3062, 98-3072). The Supreme Court then denied certiorari letting stand the lower
court ruling that White House lawyers cannot refuse to answer a federal grand jury's
questions about possible crimes committed by government officials. Office of the President
v. Office of Independent Counsel, --- S.Ct. ---, 1998 WL 541012 (Nov. 9, 1998) (No. 98-316).
However, the executive privilege issue was not the subject of the President s appeal.
22
See infra notes 26-53 and accompanying text.
23
See infra notes 54-86 and accompanying text. The court redacted a large portion of the
opinion relative to the specific information sought by the Independent Counsel. Thus, the
substantive facts surrounding the motion to compel are not entirely clear.
24
See infra notes 87-153 and accompanying text
25
See infra notes 154-157 and accompanying text.
26
See, e.g., ROZELL, supra note 10, at 142.
27
BERGER, supra note 13, at 1.
28
Archibald Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1396 (1974).
29
See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Without the
authority of Congress, President Truman ordered certain steel mills seized in an effort to end a
labor dispute that threatened the American war effort in Korea. Id. at 583. The Supreme Court
ordered the Secretary of Commerce to return the mills to private ownership despite the
President’s argument that the threat to national security justified use of inherent executive
power. Id. at 587.
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1807 in United States v. Burr. 30 The Burr court recognized judicial power to require
the president to produce evidence, 31 and it qualified that power by observing that a
court is not required “to proceed against the president as against an ordinary
individual.”32 While modern practitioners, judges, and scholars have debated the
precedent set by Burr and other non-judicial “precedents” of executive privilege, 33 the
courts did not pass on the issue again until Watergate. 34
30

25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C.D.Va. 1807) (prosecuting Colonel Aaron Burr for treason stemming
from his involvement in a secessionist conspiracy). Id.; see Paul A. Freund, The Supreme
Court, 1973 Term - Foreword: On Presidential Privilege, 88 HARV. L. REV. 13, 24-31 (1974).
The Supreme Court hinted as to the existence of the privilege four years earlier “where Chief
Justice Marshall suggested that for a court to intrude ‘into [the secrets] of the cabinet’ would
give the appearance of ‘intermeddl[ing] with the prerogatives of the executive.’ ” In re
Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 170 (1807)).
31
Cox, supra note 28, at 1392.
32
Burr, 25 F.Cas. at 192; see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708. The Burr
court further noted that the discretion to withhold portions of the disputed letter rested
exclusively in the President, and not in other members of his cabinet. Burr, 25 F.Cas. at 192.
But cf. In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (extending the privilege to
communications between advisers). For a discussion of In re Sealed Case, see infra note 51.
33

For a concise history of presidential assertions of executive privilege, see ROZELL,
supra note 10, at 32-48. Rozell argues that the frequent exercise of the power lends legitimacy
to the “philosophical and constitutional underpinnings of executive privilege.” Id. at 32; see
also UNITED STATES V. NIXON: THE PRESIDENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT 319-20, 353-62
(Leon Friedman ed., 1974) [hereinafter The President’s Main Brief]. In the context of
executive usurpation of legislative authority, the Supreme Court recognized implied
congressional acquiescence as a justification for actions taken by the Carter administration
during the Iranian hostage crisis. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678-79 (1981).
But see BERGER, supra note 13, at 165. (arguing that these “precedents” amount to usurpation
of power). “Frequent and uncritical repetition of dubious doctrine transforms it into accepted
dogma.” Id.
34
In the context of the Watergate scandal, the courts addressed the issue of executive
privilege in In re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1973); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d
700 (D.C. Cir. 1973), modifying 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1973) (holding that the judicial branch
holds the constitutional power to determine applicability of executive privilege and ordering
President Nixon to produce the White House tape-recordings for in camera inspection);
Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51 (D.D.C.
1973) (holding that a subpoena issued by the committee was unenforceable against President
Nixon because the subpoenaed material was not critical to the committee’s performance of its
legislative functions); Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon,
498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974), aff’g 366 F.Supp. 51 (D.D.C. 1973); United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683 (1974); Dellums v. Powell, 561 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that tape-recordings
of White House discussions regarding the 1971 May Day demonstrations were presumptively
privileged, but that the plaintiffs demonstrated a specific need for the tapes that overcame the
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In United States v. Nixon,35 the Supreme Court finally dealt squarely with a
presidential assertion of executive privilege. While President Nixon argued for an
absolute and unqualified privilege rooted in separation of powers principles,36 the United
States argued that an unqualified executive privilege did not exist in any form.37 The
unanimous Supreme Court indicated that “[t]he President’s need for complete candor
and objectivity from advisers calls for great deference from the courts,”38 and,
accordingly, the court recognized the existence of executive privilege. 39 However, the
Court rejected Nixon’s argument for an absolute privilege, 40 and it adopted a
privilege); Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (upholding
legislation preserving presidential documents and tape-recordings and establishing a system
of judicial and public access to the materials); and Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982)
(holding that a former president was entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability for his
official acts). For a commentary on the impact of the judiciary on the Nixon presidency and a
discussion of the Watergate litigation, see HOWARD BALL, NO PLEDGE OF PRIVACY: THE
W ATERGATE TAPES LITIGATION (1977).
35
418 U.S. 683 (1974).
36
The President’s Main Brief, supra note 33, at 350-73. The President argued in the
alternative that if the privilege was a qualified privilege, that privilege prevailed over the
subpoena duces tecum. Id. at 373-79. Ironically, Richard Nixon had spoken out against any
constitutional basis for exe cutive privilege while serving as a congressman. Norman Dorsen
& John H.F. Shattuck, Executive Privilege, the Congress and the Courts, 35 OHIO ST . L.J. 1,
1-2 (1974).
37
UNITED STATES V. NIXON: THE PRESIDENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT 210, 262-69
(Leon Friedman ed., 1974) [hereinafter The United States’ Main Brief ]. Special Prosecutor
Leon Jaworski, arguing on behalf of the United States, urged the Court to recognize executive
privilege as a qualified evidentiary privilege rather than a constitutionally based privilege.. Id.
Jaworski was appointed Special Prosecutor after President Nixon forced the removal of the
first Special Prosecutor, Archibald Cox. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 12, at 1325.
38
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706.
39
Id. at 708. “The privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.” Id. Although Nixon
was a unanimous decision, historical accounts reflect a reluctance on the part of Justices
Douglas, Brennan, and White to recognize a constitutional basis for the doctrine of executive
privilege. HOWARD BALL, “W E HAVE A DUTY, ” THE SUPREME COURT AND THE W ATERGATE
TAPES LITIGATION 143-44 (1990). Initially, the three Justices believed it was unnecessary to
reach the issue of the constitutional basis of the privilege when a common law basis for the
privilege existed. Id. Ultimately, the three reluctant Justices signed the unanimous opinion.
Id. at 149. “More than likely they ran out of time and, probably, energy in their efforts to
persuade the others that the Court should not be strengthening the presidency through the
judicial creation of the inherent power of executive privilege.” Id.
40
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706.
To read the Art. II powers of the President as providing an absolute privilege as
against a subpoena essential to enforcement of criminal statutes on no more than a
generalized claim of the public interest in confidentiality of nonmilitary and
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presumption in favor of the privilege41 as a reflection of judicial deference to the
executive branch.42 In criminal cases, the privilege may be overcome by a sufficient
showing of need by the party seeking disclosure. 43
While Nixon44 remains the exclusive Supreme Court authority on executive privilege,
the district and circuit courts of the District of Columbia have developed a body of case
law expounding on the framework of Nixon. 45 The D.C. Circuit expanded the umbrella
of privilege to include not only communications between president and adviser, but also
“communications authored or solicited and received by those members of an immediate
White House adviser’s staff who have broad and significant responsibility for
investigating and formulating the advice to be given to the President on the particular
matter to which the communications relate.”46 The D.C. Circuit supported its
expansion of the privilege to advisers arguing that such confidentiality ensures candid,
blunt communication in discussing policy alternatives.47 The court recognized that

nondiplomatic discussions would upset the constitutional balance of ‘a workable
government’ and gravely impair the role of the courts under Art. III.
Id. at 707.
41
Id. at 708.
The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and
correspondence . . . has all the values to which we accord deference for the privacy
of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the
public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential
decisionmaking. A President and those who assist him must be free to explore
alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in
a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the
considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications.
Id.
42
Id. at 708. “[I]n no case of this kind would a court be required to proceed against the
president as against an ordinary individual.” Id. (quoting U.S. v. Burr, 25 F.Cas. 187, 192
(C.C.D.Va. 1807)); see also ROZELL, supra note 10, at 152.
43
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706; see also infra notes 142-151 and accompanying text.
44
418 U.S. 683 (1974).
45
See U.S. v. AT&T, 419 F. Supp. 454 (D.D.C. 1976); U.S. v. AT&T, 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir.
1976); U.S. v. AT&T, 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977); U.S. v. Poindexter, 727 F. Supp. 1501
(D.D.C. 1989); U.S. v. Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. 135 (D.D.C. 1990); U.S. v. Poindexter, 732 F.
Supp. 142 (D.D.C. 1990); In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997); In re Sealed Case,
107 F.3d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1997); In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1997), rev’d sub nom.;
Swidler & Berlin v. U.S., 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998); Association of American Physicians &
Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
46
In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The D.C. Circuit has also
determined that the First Lady is an “adviser” for purposes of executive privilege.
Association of American Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 904-05 (D.C.
Cir. 1993).
47
In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 750.
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these conversations often take place without the participation of the President, yet they
are necessary to ensure that sound, well-reasoned advice ultimately reaches the
President.48 Although Nixon49 involved the application of the privilege in the context of
a criminal trial, 50 the D.C. Circuit has held that the standards are equally applicable in
the context of grand jury proceedings.51
Against this backdrop of policy and precedent, the District Court of the District of

48

Id. The court also outlines the arguments against expanding the privilege to
communications between advis ers. Id. at 748-49. First, the Constitution vests executive
power exclusively in the President. Id. at 748. “Since the Constitution assigns these
responsibilities to the President alone, arguably the privilege of confidentiality that derives
from them also should be the President’s alone.” Id. The privileges of the President have
traditionally expanded beyond those of other executive branch officers. Id. While the
President enjoys absolute immunity for official acts, other executive branch officers receive
only qualified immunity. Id. “[F]or purposes of separation of powers, the President stands in
an entirely different position than other members of the executive branch.” Id. at 749 (quoting
In re Kessler, 100 F.3d 1015, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Second, courts generally adhere to the
premise that privileges should be narrowly construed. In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 749.
“[E]xceptions to the demand for every man’s evidence are not lightly created nor expansively
construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth.” Id. (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at
710). Further, the growth of the executive branch in the past few decades arguably justifies a
narrow construction of the privilege. In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 749. Finally, a privilege
which encompasses presidential aides and advisers increases the potential for abuse of the
privilege. Id.
49
418 U.S. 683 (1974).
50
The Court emphasized the “fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair
administration of criminal justice” in its decision to order the production of the White House
tapes. Id. at 713.
51
In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 743 [hereinafter Espy]. Secretary of Agriculture Michael
Espy was the subject of a grand jury investigation into allegations that Espy “improperly
accepted gifts from individuals and organizations with business before the United States
Department of Agriculture.” Id. at 734. In response to the public accusations of wrongdoing
in the Department of Agriculture, President Clinton ordered an internal White House
investigation to determine the appropriateness of executive action against Espy. Id. at 735.
The results of this internal investigation became the subject of a grand jury subpoena. Id.
When the Clinton administration invoked executive privilege, the unique issue presented to
the court was whether the privilege encompassed certain documents comprised of
communications between advisers, as opposed to communications between the President and
his advisers. Id. at 749-50. The D.C. Circuit, in an opinion authored by Judge Wald, vacated
and remanded a District Court ruling upholding the White House’s claim of privilege. Id. at
762. Although the D.C. Circuit agreed that the communications at issue were presumptively
privileged, the court vacated and remanded on grounds that the District Court erred in
holding that the Independent Counsel failed to demonstrate a sufficient need for the
evidence. Id.
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Columbia faced yet another assertion of the privilege in In re Grand Jury Proceedings.52
As the Independent Counsel’s investigation of the Clinton administration trudged
forward, the focus of the judicial inquiry shifted away from the communicator of the
information, and toward the nature of communication at issue. 53
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In January 1994, Attorney General Janet Reno appointed Independent Counsel54
Robert B. Fiske to investigate alleged financial improprieties on the part of President
Clinton and Hillary Rodham Clinton relative to a failed development project known as
“Whitewater.”55 Kenneth Starr56 replaced Fiske on August, 5 1994 when Fiske’s term
52

5 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 1998).
Id. at 26-27; see also infra notes 115-122 and accompanying text.
54
The statutory authority for appointment of an Independent Counsel is contained in the
Ethics in Government Act at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599. § 592(c) states:
(1) Application for appointment of independent counsel. The Attorney General
shall apply to the division of the court for the appointment of an independent
counsel if(A) the Attorney General, upon completion of a preliminary investigation under
this chapter, determines that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
further investigation is warranted; or
(B) the 90-day period referred to in subsection (a)(1), and any extension granted
under subsection (a)(3), have elapsed and the Attorney General has not
filed a notification with the division of the court under subsection (b)(1).
In determining under this chapter whether reasonable grounds exist to
warrant further investigation, the Attorney General shall comply with the
written or other established policies of the Department of Justice with
respect to the conduct of criminal investigations.
28 U.S.C. § 592(c).
53

55

Susan Schmidt, Whitewater Partners Face Fraud Charges; McDougals’ Indictment
Cites Land Deals, W ASH. POST, August 18, 1995, at A1.
In 1978, then Arkansas Attorney General Bill Clinton and Hillary Clinton joined with Jim
and Susan McDougal to borrow over $200,000 to purchase a tract of land in Ozark Mountains
with the intention of developing vacation homes. Id. The group organized as the Whitewater
Development Corporation. Id. When Bill Clinton was elected Governor, he appointed Jim
McDougal to the post of Economic Development Director. Id. Clinton lost his reelection bid
in 1980. Id. In 1982, McDougal purchased a small savings and loan, while Clinton was again
elected Governor. Id.
Federal regulators began questioning the stability of McDougal’s savings and loan
institution in 1984, and McDougal hired the Rose Law Firm, where Hillary Clinton was a
partner, to work for the struggling savings and loan. Id. In the fall of 1985, Susan McDougal
borrowed $300,000 from a loan company operated by David Hale, a Democratic municipal
judge. Id. This loan company was backed by federal funds through the Small Business
Administration. Id. On her loan application, Susan McDougal indicated the purpose of the
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expired.57 A United States Court of Appeals panel of judges 58 refused to re-appoint
Fiske because of a potential conflict of interest.59
The Starr probe eventually expanded to encompass allegations of perjury and
obstruction of justice involving sexual impropriety on the part of the President.60 On
loan was to finance her fledgling marketing company. Id. However, the funds were actually
plowed back into Jim McDougal’s burgeoning real estate corporation and the floundering
Whitewater project. Id. Hale later claimed that Bill Clinton pressured him into making the
loan. Id.
Problems at the savings and loan mounted over the late 1980’s, and eventually it collapsed
in 1989. Id. Meanwhile, Susan McDougal claimed she attempted to convince the Clintons to
get out of the Whitewater project in 1987, but Hillary Clinton refused. Id. For several years in
the mid-1980s, the Clintons allegedly took improper tax deductions on the Whitewater
property, claiming interest payments actually made by Whitewater Development Corporation.
Id. Jim McDougal was indicted on federal fraud charges related to activities at the savings
and loan, and acquitted in 1990. Id. In 1992, a Clinton presidential campaign report claimed
losses on the Whitewater property around $60,000. Id. This report became a topic of dispute
as Jim McDougal claimed that he heavily subsidized the venture, limiting the Clintons losses.
Id. Three years of delinquent Whitewater corporate tax returns were filed in June of 1993. Id.
Deputy White House Counsel Vince Foster, who worked on the Whitewater problem for
the Clintons and was formerly employed by the Rose Law Firm, committed suicide a month
later. See generally CHRISTOPHER RUDDY, THE STRANGE DEATH OF VINCENT FOSTER (1997).
Federal investigators were denied access to Foster’s office immediately following the
discovery of his body, while White House aids entered the office soon thereafter and
removed some files. Id. at 134. In December of 1993, the White House agreed to turn over the
Whitewater documents to the Justice Department, including the files removed from the office
of Foster. Ruth Marcus & Michael Isikoff, Clinton Releases Files on Land Deal; Access to
Papers is Limited to Justice Dept., WASH. POST, December 24, 1993, at A1. Hale and the
McDougals were eventually convicted of fraud in connection with the improper loan to Susan
McDougal. See generally JIM M CDOUGAL & CURTIS W ILKIE, A RKANSAS M ISCHIEF (1998).
56
Kenneth Starr served as a law clerk for former Chief Justice Warren E. Berger (19751977), Counselor to the attorney general of the United States Department of Justice (19811983), judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (1983-1989), and
Solicitor General for the Department of Justice (1989-1993) before being named Independent
Counsel. W HO’S W HO IN A MERICA 4091 (51st ed. 1997).
57
Susan Schmidt, Judges Replace Fiske as Whitewater Counsel; Ex-Solicitor General
Starr to Take Over Probe, W ASH. POST, August 6, 1994, at A1.
58
This special division of the United States Court of Appeals was created by statute. See
generally 28 U.S.C. § 49. The panel consists of three judges who are appointed by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 49(d). One judge must be appointed from the D.C.
Circuit, and no count may have more than one judge sitting on the panel. Id.
59
The conflict of interest arose because Fiske was appointed by Attorney General Janet
Reno, who in turn served at the behest of the President. Schmidt, supra note 57.
60
Pursuant to the Paula Jones litigation, White House intern Monica Lewinsky signed a
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February 18, February 19, and March 12, 1998, Deputy White House Counsel Bruce
Lindsey testified before the grand jury in Washington D.C., but he refused to answer a
number of questions regarding Monica Lewinsky,61 the civil case Jones v. Clinton, 62
and the Independent Counsel’s investigation.63 The White House asserted executive
January 7, 1998 affidavit denying sexual relations with the President. On January 12, 1998, the
Independent Counsel received certain “allegations”
(i) that Ms. Lewinsky had had a sexual relationship with President Clinton; (ii) that a
friend of the President has advised Ms. Lewinsky on how to respond to her
subpoena in the Jones case, found an attorney to represent her, and helped her find
a new job; and (iii) that Ms. Lewinsky had tried to persuade Linda Tripp, a witness
in the Jones suit, to commit perjury.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment, U.S. v. Clinton, 118 S.Ct. 2079 (1998)
(No. 97-1924), in Washingtonpost.com Special Report: Clinton Accused (last modified
May
28,
1998)
<http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/special/clinton/stories/petition052898.htm>. [hereinafter OIC’s Petition for
Writ of Certiorari]. On January 16, 1998, the Special Division of the United States Court
of Appeals conferred jurisdiction on the Office of the Independent Counsel to
investigate “whether Monica Lewinsky or others suborned perjury, obstructed justice,
intimidated witnesses or otherwise violated federal law.” Id. President Clinton provided
deposition testimony in Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-290 (E.D. Ark.), on January 17,
1998. Memorandum of the White House in Opposition to OIC’s Motion to Compel, In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, Nos. 98-095, 98-096, 98-097, in Washingtonpost.com Special
Report:
Clinton
Accused
(last
modified
May
28,
1998)
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/whitehouse
052898. htm> at *4 [hereinafter Memorandum of the White House]. The President was
asked questions regarding Lewinsky in the course of his deposition testimony. Id.
61
Monica Lewinsky served as a White House intern in the Clinton administration until her
removal following the surfacing of allegations of impropriety. Susan Schmidt et al., Clinton
Accused of Urging Aide to Lie; Starr Probes Whether President Told Woman to Deny
Alleged Affair to Jones’s Lawyers, W ASH. POST, January 21, 1998, at A1. On July 28, 1998,
Lewinsky agreed to testify before the grand jury in exchange for immunity. Peter Baker &
Susan Schmidt, Lewinsky Gets Immunity for Her Testimony; Sources say Clinton to Tell of
Clinton Bid to Hide Affair, W ASH. POST, July 29, 1998, at A1. The Independent Counsel’s
subpoena issued to President Clinton on July 17, 1998 was withdrawn after the President
agreed to provide videotaped testimony on August 17, 1998 from the White House. Don Balz
& Susan Schmidt, Prosecutor, President Face Off Lewinsky’s Immunity Deal Sets Stage for
Historic Confrontation, WASH. POST, August 2, 1998, at A1. On September 9, 1998, the
Senate convened a hearing to discuss the legal basis and procedure for impeachment
proceedings against the President. George Lardner Jr., Senate Hearing Debates
Impeachment Process, WASH. POST, September 10, 1998, at A13. For the report of
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr, see Referral to the United States House of
Representatives (Office Independent Counsel), available in 1998 WL 614815.
62
869 F. Supp 690 (E.D. Ark. 1994), rev’d in part by, Jones v. Clinton 72 F.3d 1359 (8th Cir.
(Ark.) 1996).
63
OIC’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 60, at *5.
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privilege and attorney-client privilege on behalf of Lindsey who refused to answer
pertinent questions.64 On February 26, 1998, presidential assistant Sydney Blumenthal65
appeared before the grand jury, and he likewise asserted executive privilege in refusing
to answer questions regarding Lewinsky, Jones, and the Independent Counsel’s
investigation.66
The Independent Counsel filed motions with the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia to compel the testimony of Lindsey, Blumenthal, and a third
individual67 regarding Lewinsky, Jones, and the Independent Counsel’s investigation.68
The White House responded with a memorandum in opposition to the motions to
compel, 69 and the Independent Counsel followed with a reply memorandum in support
of the motion to compel. 70 The District Court for the District of Columbia held closed
hearings on the motions, and, in its opinion and order entered May 4, 1998, granted the
motions to compel the testimony of Lindsey and Blumenthal. 71 The White House filed
motions for reconsideration which were denied on May 26, 1998,72 and the district
court released the redacted opinion73 the following day.74
In contrast to the lengthy memorandum submitted by the White House, the brief
reply memorandum submitted by the Independent Counsel urged the court to adopt a
bright line rule for determining whether presidential communications are presumptively
privileged. 75 The Independent Counsel argued that “[e]xecutive privilege is flatly
inapplicable to a President’s private conduct,”76 and he placed the burden of
64

Id.
Sydney Blumenthal was a journalist until President Clinton tabbed him as an assistant
in July of 1997. Blumenthal worked on the staffs of New Yorker magazine, the Washington
Post, New Republic, and Vanity Fair. Howard Kurtz, The Clintons’ Pen Pal S.D. Blumenthal
Leaving Journalism to work for the White House, W ASH. POST, June 16, 1997, at C1.
66
OIC’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 60, at *5.
67
The third unidentified party later withdrew his claims of privilege thereby rendering the
motion moot as to his testimony. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d 21, 24 (D.D.C.
1998).
68
OIC’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 60, at *5.
69
The memorandum was submitted on behalf of the White House by attorneys W. Neil
Eggleston and Timothy K. Armstrong. Memorandum of the White House at *29.
70
OIC’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *5.
71
Id.
72
Id. at *3.
73
The opinion is marked by significant redactions because of the sensitive nature of the
information at issue in the case.
74
OIC’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 60, at *3.
75
The “presumption” of executive privilege is discussed infra PART IV. A.
76
Independent Counsel’s Motion to Compel at *2, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Nos. 98095, 98-096, 98-097, in Washingtonpost.com Special Report: Clinton Accused (last modified
May
28,
1998)
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp65
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demonstrating the official nature of the conduct on the shoulders of the Executive. 77 In
the alternative, the Independent Counsel asserted that the showing of need would be
sufficient to overcome the privilege. 78
Conversely, the White House argued that “[t]he critical question is not the nature of
the underlying conduct; it is the purpose of the advice being given.”79 From this
premise, advice sought “to deal with the threat of impeachment” is “official” advice. 80
Although the showing of need was sufficient in Nixon81 to overcome the
presumption of privilege, the White House reminded the court that the conversations
about the break-in at the Democratic National Committee Headquarters were “not about
an official function of the President,” but were nonetheless presumptively privileged.82

srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/lindsey052898. htm> [hereinafter, OIC’s Motion to
Compel]; see also Dorsen & Shattuck, supra note 36, at 31.
77
OIC’s Motion to Compel, supra note 76, at *2.
In trying to bar the testimony of White House aides, the President advances a
theory that is breathtaking in scope. Executive privilege applies here, according to
the President, because the allegations of purely private matters have had “a
demonstrable effect on the operations of the White House as an institution.” Under
this reasoning, every potential White House scandal can be shrouded in the
Executive privilege. If a President were to murder a political opponent, he could
argue that the resulting uproar could impair his legislative program, distract him from
his duties, affect his dealings with foreign heads of state, and potentially give rise to
impeachment proceedings - the very arguments raised by the White House here.
Id. at *1-2.
78
Id. at *2.
79
Memorandum of the White House, supra note 60, at *2; see also A DAM CARLYLE
BRECKENRIDGE, THE EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OVER INFORMATION 109
(1974).
80
Memorandum of the White House, supra note 60, at *2. Some commentators have
attempted to distinguish communications which contain “advice” from communications
which contain “facts.” See, e.g., Dorsen & Shattuck, supra note 36, at 31. Separating “facts”
from “advice” is difficult, but not impossible. Id. The executive branch engages in this
process often under the Freedom of Information Act. Id. “Without this separation, the
advice privilege invites abuse.” Id. Where facts are inextricably intertwined with the policy
making process, secrecy should prevail. Id. However, “[t]here should be no executive
privilege when Congress has already acquired substantial evidence that the information
requested concerns wrong-doing by executive officials or presidential aids.” Id. The Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is sufficient protection for executive officials
accused of wrong-doing. Id.
81
418 U.S. 683 (1974). For a dicussion of the Supreme Court’s justification for the
presumption of privilege, see supra note 41 and accompanying text.
82
Memorandum of the White House, supra note 60, at *17.
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The White House rejected any notion that the President bears the burden of
establishing the official nature of his conduct to raise a presumption of privilege, 83 yet it
offered examples of how discussions related to the Lewinsky matter fell within the
rubric of the President’s Article II duties.84 Moreover, the White House concluded that
the Independent Counsel could not make a “focused demonstration of need”85 sufficient
to overcome the presumption in favor of the privilege. 86
IV. ANALYSIS
The District Court for the District of Columbia 87 rejected the bright line rule
advocated by the Independent Counsel, resolving the “presumption” issue by construing
Nixon88 and In re Sealed Case89 to impose a duty on the court to treat the
communications at issue as presumptively privileged.90 However, the rationale
supporting the ruling on presumption91 provides little guidance in discerning the role of
the presumption in privilege claims.92 The court discussed the scope of the privilege
83

Id. at *18.
The proffered examples included discussions relating to: the President’s State of the
Union Address (the President decided not to discuss the matter in his address),
Memorandum of the White House,supra note 60, at *23-24, “matters of foreign policy and
military affairs” Id. (responding to inquiries from foreign nations regarding the Lewinsky
matter and “[d]eliberations within the White House about how to keep the controversy
related to the Lewinsky matter from hampering the President’s conduct of the nations military
and foreign policy. . . .”); impeachment, Id. at *24-25; allocation of presidential time, Id.at *2526 (how to minimize the interference created by the Jones litigation); strategy discussions
relating to the Independent Counsel Investigation, Id. at *26-27 (“. . . these discussions
formed an on-going part of the advisor’s function to counsel the President on decisions he
must make . . .”); “discussions as to whether to assert executive privilege,” Id. at *26-27 (“. . .
these discussions occurred while advising the President in connection with a decision only
he could make in his official capacity . . .”). The White House offered the examples “solely for
illustrative purposes,” asserting that “[n]othing in Nixon or [In re] Sealed Case suggests that
the question whether a particular issue calls for direct involvement and decisionmaking by the
President is amenable to judicial review” or “open to question after the fact by the OIC.” Id.
at *23.
85
The phrase “focused demonstration of need” is quoted from Espy, 121 F.3d 729, 746.
For a discussion of requisite demonstration of need, see infra notes 147-153 and
accompanying text.
86
Memorandum of the White House, supra note 60, at *29.
87
The opinion was authored by Chief United States District Judge Norma Holloway
Johnson.
88
418 U.S. 683 (1974).
89
Espy, 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
90
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp 2d 21, 25 (D.D.C. 1998).
91
Id.
92
See infra notes 95-136 and accompanying text.
84
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relative to the President’s advisers, holding that Blumenthal and Lindsey fell within the
rubric of executive privilege. 93 The court concluded the analysis of executive privilege
by holding that the Independent Counsel demonstrated a specific need for the
information in the context of the grand jury investigation which outweighed the interests
of the executive in non-disclosure. 94
A. The Presumption of Privilege
Governmental secrecy provides a convenient vehicle for abuse of power.95 Abuse
of power breeds public distrust of government.96 Arguments favoring a narrow
construction of the “presumption” reflect a distrust of government rooted in past
abuses of power.97 In particular, the abuses of the Watergate scandal left many with a
jaded view of presidential privilege claims.98 The public distrust of government created
in the wake of Watergate has fueled arguments in favor of a presumption against the
privilege. 99
A second concern voiced in support of a restricted construction of the
“presumption” involves accountability in government.100 Information hidden from the
public would not be considered in evaluating the performance of the elected
president.101 Thus, when voters cast ballots in ignorance of the truth, the president is
effectively “unaccountable” to the electorate. 102 Despite the compelling arguments
93

In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 26-27.
Id. at 28-30.
95
See generally W ISE, supra note 13 (arguing that democracy will work only if those
consenting to be governed know what they are consenting to).
96
Id. at 342. Wise states that a Knight newspaper study in 1970 (three years before the
Watergate scandal) reported that a substantial number of Americans did not believe the
United States actually landed men on the moon. Id. at 341. “Go vernment deception,
supported by a pervasive system of official secrecy and an enormous public relations
machine, has reaped a harvest of massive public distrust.” Id. at 342.
97
David B. Frohnmayer, Essays on Executive Privilege, in SAMUEL POOL W EAVER
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SERIES , NO. 1 (American Bar Foundation 1974). “Modern history
demonstrates that the constitutional or legal obligations which presidents have asserted to lie
within an ‘official capacity’ are breathtakingly sweeping in scope.” Id. at 3.
98
ROZELL, supra note 10, at 142. “[T]he doctrine of executive privilege has fallen into
disrepute because of the [leadership] abuses of one presidency.” Id.
99
HALPERIN & HOFFMAN, supra note 8, at 104. “The presumptions must be turned around.
Whatever is needed for public debate must be made public. The burden must be on those
who would keep a secret.” Id.
100
See W ISE, supra note 13, at 64. “[Secrecy] permits [the President] to control
information . . . and to filter the truth before it reaches Congress and the voters.” Id.
101
ORMAN, supra note 8, at 195.
102
Cf., W ISE, supra note 13, at 345. “[E]ven if the truth later emerges, it seldom does so in
time to influence public opinion or public policy.” Id; see also ORMAN, supra note 8, at 195.
94

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol32/iss1/3

16

Popson: In re Grand Jury Proceedings

1999]
IN RE GRAND J URY PROCEEDINGS
favoring a narrow construction of the “presumption,”103 courts have systematically
interpreted the “presumption” liberally.104 In delineating the presumption in favor of
executive privilege, the Supreme Court did not directly address the concerns of public
distrust of government and democratic accountability.105 Likewise, the D.C. Circuit
has refrained from framing its opinions on the presumption in terms of public trust and
democratic accountability.106 In re Grand Jury Proceedings follows suit by strictly
adhering to precedent in finding the presumption applicable. 107
Judicial indifference to “trust” and “accountability” rationales reflects the role of the
courts under separation of powers doctrine. 108 The concerns expressed in favor of a
narrow construction of the presumption are legitimate, but courts should view
executive privilege with “a dispassionate and thoughtful perspective on the powers and
duties of the presidency as an institution, rather than as a reflection of a particular
incumbent.”109 In Nixon, the Supreme Court justified the presumption as a guardian of
candid advice and creativity in the executive branch.110
In In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 111 the district court adopted the White House
103

See supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Espy, 121 F.3d at 744 “The President can invoke the privilege when asked to
produce documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and
deliberations and that the President believes should remain confidential. If the President does
so, the documents become presumptively privileged.” Id.
105
See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703-713.
106
See cases cited supra notes 34 & 45.
104

107

5 F. Supp. 2d 21, 27 (D.D.C. 1998).
Under Nixon, the Court has a duty to treat the subpoenaed testimony as
presumptively privileged. In light of this binding precedent, the factual similarities
between the Nixon cases and the case at hand, and the evidence submitted with
respect to the President’s invocation of privilege, this Court finds that it must treat
the communications of Lindsey and Blumenthal as presumptively privileged.

Id.
108

See ROZELL, supra note 10, at 142-47. “[O]nly a proper understanding of the separation
of powers doctrine can help resolve the inherent conflict between governmental secrecy and
the ‘right to know.’” Id. at 145.
109
Ellen M. Stanton, Executive Privilege: An Institutional Perspective, in SAMUEL POOL
W EAVER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SERIES , NO. 1, at 19 (American Bar Foundation 1974); see also
Cox, supra note 28, at 1410-11.
110
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708; see also Cox, supra note 28, at 1410. Aside from this “candid
interchange” doctrine, national security and foreign affairs matters have traditionally
supported executive privilege claims. Colleen B. Grzeskowiak, Note, Executive Privilege and
Non-Presidential Actors: The Distress of “Tidy-Minded Constitutionalists” Continues, 38
SYRACUSE L. REV. 991, 996-97 (1987).
111
5 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 1998).
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argument that “no court had ever declined to treat executive communications as
presumptively privileged on grounds that the matters discussed involved private
conduct.”112 The focus of the inquiry is not on “the nature of the conduct that the
subpoenaed material might reveal,”113 but rather on the context in which the information
is sought and the degree to which the material is necessary to achieve the appropriate
goals of the proceeding.114
By shifting the focus toward “the context in which the information is sought” and
away from “the nature of the conduct,” the courts maintain flexibility by avoiding a
precise boundary for executive privilege. 115 The presumption is designed to “confine
the inroads upon executive confidentiality so narrowly as to minimize possible injury to
the Presidency.”116 In assessing the “context in which the information is sought,” the
court drafted a distinction between conversations “involv[ing] private conduct”117 and
“purely private conversations.”118 The court found that the former are entitled to a
presumption of privilege, while the latter are not.119 Recognizing the need of the
President “to address personal matters in the context of his official decisions,”120 the
court rejected the Independent Counsel’s construction of the presumption of
112

Id. at 25. The court went on to acknowledge the White House assertion that Nixon
recognized a presumption despite the arguably unofficial nature of the Watergate break-in.
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. (citing Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, 498 F.2d at 730).
“In other words, the nature of the presidential conduct at issue, whether it was official or
private, appeared not to affect the presumption of privilege or the need stage of the D.C.
Circuit’s executive privilege analysis.” In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 26.
115
See ROZELL, supra note 10, at 143. “[T]here are no clear, precise constitutional
boundaries that determine . . . whether any particular claim of executive privilege is
legitimate.” Id. “Such a power cannot be subject to precise definition because it is
impossible to determine in advance all of the circumstances under which presidents may have
to exercise that power.” Id.
116
Cox, supra note 28, at 1411.
117
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 25-26.
118
Id. (emphasis added). In holding “purely private” conversations are not
presumptively privileged, the court relied on Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs, 433 U.S.
425, 449 (1977) (noting that the privilege is “limited to communications ‘in performance of [a
President’s] responsibilities,’ ‘of his office,’ and made ‘in the process of shaping policies and
making decisions’ “); Espy, 121 F.3d at 752 (“Of course, the privilege only applies to
commu nications that these advisers and their staff author or solicit and receive in the course
of performing their function of advising the President on official government matters”).
119
5 F. Supp. 2d at 25-26. The most common justification for the privilege focuses on the
need for candor in executive deliberations. See, e.g,. Cox, supra note 28, at 1410. However, in
Nixon “the Supreme Court added an interest in privacy - a concern never thought to lessen
the duty of an ordinary citizen.” Id.
120
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 26.
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privilege121 as “oversimplified.”122
The court defended its position on the presumption issue by noting that a
determination of the “private” or “official” nature of the communications was
impossible absent an in camera proceeding.123 However, an in camera proceeding is
not available unless the Independent Counsel demonstrates a sufficient need for the
requested evidence to overcome the presumption in favor of the privilege. 124 In other
words, in camera review is not available to determine whether the presumption applies,
but it is only available to overcome the presumption.125 Therefore, the burden of
proving a “purely private” conversation fell on the Independent Counsel without the
benefit of in camera review.126
The court distinguished this case from Espy127 on the grounds that the latter
involved a subpoena of documents, while the former involved a subpoena of
testimony.128 Claiming an inability to review the potential testimony of the witnesses in
camera, the court reasoned that its “ability to assess whether the subpoenaed materials
relate to official decisions is thus greatly hindered.”129 Unfortunately, this rationale
creates an inference that if the evidence sought by the Independent Counsel existed in
the form of documents rather than testimony,130 in camera inspection would be
available to determine whether the communications “related to official decisions.”131
121

See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 26-28. The Supreme Court rejected a
similar argument in Nixon. BRECKENRIDGE, supra note 79, at 147. The prosecutor “argued
that the President had an enforceable legal duty to comply and under no circumstances could
executive privilege be invoked on either the alleged illegal activities or those relating to the
political campaign. Campaign activities, he insisted, were not a constitutional duty and thus
not protected.” Id. at 146-47.
123
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 26-28. “The Court does not have
documents or tapes to review in camera that could establish whether the content of the
subpoenaed communications relates only to private matters . . . [t]he Court is aware of only
the unanswered questions themselves.” Id. at 26.
124
See, e.g., Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, 498 F.2d at 730
(stating “[P]residential conversations are ‘presumptively privileged,’ even from the limited
intrusion represented by in camera examination of the conversations by a court”).
125
Id.
126
Cf., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 26-28.
127
121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997). For a discussion of Espy, see supra note 51.
128
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 26.
129
Id. It is unclear why the court did not recognize its power to compel the in camera
testimony of the witnesses, just as it may compel the in camera inspection of documents.
See BRECKENRIDGE, supra note 79, at 152-53.
130
The evidence at issue in Espy, 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997), consisted strictly of
documents.
131
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 26-27.
122
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Such an inference would be inconsistent with requiring the party seeking disclosure to
demonstrate the “purely private” nature of the communications before an in camera
inspection.132
The practical result of the court’s holding relative to the presumption is that an
invocation of executive privilege by a president will invariably raise a presumption in
favor of the privilege. 133 It is unlikely that a party seeking disclosure could demonstrate
that conversations between the president and an adviser related exclusively to private
matters.134 Ultimately, the presumption in favor of the privilege reflects the need to
protect the institution of the Presidency in the constitutional scheme of separation of
powers,135 while at the same time retaining the capacity of the courts “to pose as a
viable check on executive abuses of the privilege.”136
B. The Scope of the Privilege
Executive privilege encompasses not only communications between the president
and his advisers,137 but also certain communications between advisers pursuant to
providing advic e to the president.138 Certain conversations between Bruce Lindsey
132

See supra note 118 and accompanying text. “Presidential conversations are
‘presumptively privileged,’ even from the limited intrusion represented by an in camera
examination of the conversations by a court.” Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign
Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 730 (1974).
133
Cf., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 25-27. The presumption is
“sustained by reason and authority.” Cox, supra note 28, at 1410; see also supra note 104.
134
If the party possesses proof of the content of the conversations, they probably fail the
“demonstrated specific need portion of the analysis. See infra notes 147-53.
135
See generally Stanton, supra note 109 (arguing that executive privilege is an
institutional privilege that preserves federal ideals of separation of powers).
136
ROZELL, supra note 10, at 152.
137
BRECKENRIDGE, supra note 79, at 110. “The advice privilege is fundamental to
executive privacy and presidents insist that discussions with advisers must be fully
protected.” Id.
138
Espy, 121 F.3d at 752. The extension of the privilege to include such communications
has been criticized. See Recent Cases, 111 HARV. L. REV. 861 (1998). Critics argue that other
privileges such as the deliberative process privilege are sufficient to protect communications
between advisers, rendering extension of the presidential communications privilege
unnecessary. Id. at 861. The deliberative process privilege is a common law privilege that
protects “documents and other materials that would reveal ‘advisory opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental
decisions and policies are formulated.’ ” Id. at 865-66 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 116 F.3d
550, 557 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). “Unlike the presidential communications privilege, which throws a
blanket of confidentiality over all communications among officials of a certain level, the
deliberative process privilege protects only those communications that relate to executive
decisionmaking.” Id. at 866.
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and an unnamed third party did not occur “in conjunction with the process of
advising the President,” and therefore fell beyond the scope of the privilege. 139
Thus, Lindsey could not avoid answering questions regarding these particular
conversations by asserting the presidential communications privilege. 140 However,
conversations between Lindsey and Mrs. Clinton, as well as conversations between
Sydney Blumenthal and Mrs. Clinton, were held within the scope of the privilege. 141

C. The Independent Counsel’s Showing of Need
In opening its “need” analysis, the Court reiterated the long standing rule that the
presumption in favor of executive privilege “may be rebutted by a sufficient showing of
need by the Independent Counsel.”142 The Court carefully points out the vague
standard announced in Nixon requiring a “demonstrated, specific need” for the evidence
sought.143 Relying on the Nixon line of cases 144 and the Espy case, 145 the Court
required the Independent Counsel to first show “that each discrete group of the
subpoenaed materials likely contains important evidence; and second, that this evidence
is not available with due diligence elsewhere.”146
139

In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d 21, 27 (D.D.C. 1998). The content of these
conversations was redacted from the opinion.
140
Id. The doctrine of executive privilege encompasses not only a “presidential
communications” privilege, but also a “deliberative process” privilege which protects
communications made in the executive decisionmaking process. Russell L. Weaver & James
T.R. Jones, The Deliberative Process Privilege, 54 M O. L. REV. 279, 279 (1989); see also supra
note 138.
141
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
142
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 28 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. at 713); Espy, 121 F.3d at 742; Dellums v. Powell, 561 F.2d 242, 249 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Senate
Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d at 730.
143
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 28. The “demonstrated, specific need”
discussed in Nixon reflects the Supreme Court’s recognition of a conflict between coequal
branches. Clark, supra note 17, at 336. While the President implores secrecy as a necessity to
carry out his constitutional responsibilities under Article II, the courts must obtain evidence
to discharge its constitutional responsibilities under Article III. Id. For a discussion of the
imprecision of the Nixon standard, see Cox, supra note 28, at 1414. One judge has
commented that the Nixon standard is so vague that “the Court does not appear to have
meant anything more than the showing that satisfied [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure]
17(c).” United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also infra note 148.
144
See supra note 34. “[T]hese opinions balance[d] the public interests served by
protecting the President’s confidentiality in a particular context with those furthered by
requiring disclosure.” Espy, 121 F.3d at 753.
145
121 F.3d 729.
146
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 28 (quoting Espy, 121 F.3d at 754).
“These elements must be shown ‘with specificity.’ ” Id. (quoting Espy, 121 F.3d at 756).
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This two prong analysis developed as the D.C. Circuit construed the meaning of a
“demonstrated, specific need “ over the course of two decades.147 The first
requirement is essentially the equivalent of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c),148
and, therefore, it does not serve as a major obstacle to a sufficient showing of need.149
The second requirement entails detailed documentation of efforts to obtain the needed
information from other sources.150 If the Independent Counsel satisfies the two prong
test, the court orders the subpoenaed party to testify provided the testimony will
“produce information relevant to the general subject of the grand jury’s
investigation.”151 Upon reviewing the information sought by the Independent Counsel
and the explanations of why the inquiries were directed at the White House, the court
held that the testimony of Bruce Lindsey and Sydney Blumenthal was “likely to contain
relevant evidence that is important to the grand jury’s investigation”152 and granted the

“The information sought need not be critical to an accurate judicial determination.” Id.
(quoting Espy, 121 F.3d at 754).
147
See supra notes 34 & 45 and accompanying text . “The [Nixon cases] employed a
balancing methodology in analyzing whether, and in what circumstances, the presidential
privilege can be overcome. Under this methodology, these opinions balanced the public
interests served by protecting the President’s confidentiality in a particular context with those
furthered by requiring disclosure.” Espy, 121 F.3d at 753.
148
FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c) merely limits a subpoena to relevant information, stating:
For Production of Documentary Evidence and of Objects. A subpoena may also
command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers,
documents or other objects designated therein. The court on motion made promptly
may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or
oppressive. The court may direct that books, papers, documents or objects
designated in the subpoena be produced before the court at a time prior to the trial
or prior to the time when they are to be offered in evidence and may upon their
production permit the books, papers, documents or objects or portions thereof to be
inspected by the parties and their attorneys.
Id.
149

In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 28. But see Cox, supra note 28, at 141415. Cox points out two additional prerequisites. First, the case must involve “serious criminal
charges against high government officials.” Id. at 1415. Second, in the criminal context, there
is “already an implicit determination, based upon evidence aliunde, of probable cause to
believe that the officials named as defendants have committed serious crimes.” Id.
150
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 28. The D.C. Circuit has recognized that
in situations where an immediate White House adviser is under investigation for alleged
criminal conduct, the second requirement should easily be met. Id.
151
Id. (quoting U.S. v. R. Enterprises, 498 U.S. 292, 300 (1991)). Ordinarily, the initial
burden is on the subpoenaed party to demonstrate the unreasonableness of a grand jury
subpoena. R. Enterprises, 498 U.S. at 301.
152
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 29. “The OIC has been authorized to
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V. CONCLUSION
Executive privilege lies at the crossroads of politics and the law, and it remains one
of the murkiest and misunderstood areas of constitutional law.154 Beyond the lack of
recent Supreme Court guidance on the applicable standards regarding executive
privilege, the political undercurrents of the day assure the doctrine’s volatility.155 In re
Grand Jury Proceedings illustrates the dilemma encountered by the courts when faced
with balancing the competing interests which arise when a President asserts the
privilege. 156

investigate whether Monica Lewinsky ‘or others,’ including President Clinton, suborned
perjury, obstructed justice, or tampered with witnesses.” Id. “The testimony sought and
withheld based on executive privilege is likely to shed light on that inquiry, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory.” Id.
153
Id. An evaluation of the Court’s ruling relative to the Independent Counsel’s
demonstration of need will only occur in retrospect. This heavily redacted portion of the
opinion defies comprehensive analysis. However, the court commented that “if the President
disclosed to a senior advisor that he committed perjury, suborned perjury, or obstructed
justice, such a disclosure is not only unlikely to be recorded on paper, but it also would
constitute some of the most relevant and important evidence to the grand jury investigation.”
Id. This tiny portal provides a mere glimpse into the ex parte submission of the Independent
Counsel.
154
See ROZELL, supra note 10, at 1.
155
In light of the political ramifications associated with a Presidential claim of privilege,
the lower courts may likely continue to shape the law of executive privilege. Cf., ROZELL,
supra note 10, at 140-141. “No post-Watergate administration has been willing to take an
aggressive posture toward executive privilege to reestablish the political viability of that
constitutional doctrine. Clearly, each administration has perceived the political costs to be
too great.” Id. at 140. The inevitably partisan nature of the issue promotes uncertainty in
determining the applicable standards in individual cases. See Michael Nelson, Forward to
M ARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: THE DILEMMA OF SECRECY AND DEMOCRATIC
A CCOUNTABILITY ix, ix-x (1994).
From the 1930s until the 1960s, an era in which the Democrats usually controlled the
White House, executive privilege was championed by liberals and opposed by
conservatives. During the 1970s and 1980s, when Republican presidents were the
norm, conservatives and liberals changed sides on the issue and, often, exchanged
arguments: conservatives who had once emphasized the dangers of executive
privilege and found no basis for it in the Constitution now saw what liberals had
previously seen (but no longer saw) namely, that executive privilege is inherent in
the executive power. (Liberals, for their part, found the abandoned conservative
arguments suddenly persuasive).
Id.
156
For a discussion of the competing interests at stake relative to executive privilege, see
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While representing victory for the Executive in terms of bolstering the presumption
in favor of the privilege, the case also represents defeat in terms of the President’s
quest for confidentiality. Ultimately, executive privilege is a doctrine which safeguards
the presidency, but not necessarily the President.157
James M. Popson

generally Dorsen & Shattuck, supra note 36.
157
Stanton, supra note 109, at 31. “[In In re Grand Jury Proceedings] it appears the
privilege is being used with regard to personal, not governmental matters, to protect Mr.
Clinton politically rather than to protect the institution of the presidency.” Marcia Coyle,
Author: Privilege Argument Weak, NAT’L L.J., May 18, 1998, at A10 (quoting Mark Rozell).
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